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Parliamentary war powers and 
the role of  international law 
in foreign troop deployment 
decisions: The US-led coalition 
against “Islamic State” in Iraq 
and Syria
Tom Ruys,* Luca Ferro,** and Tim Haesebrouck***
This article addresses the degree of  parliamentary involvement in decisions to deploy armed 
forces abroad. It observes how the recourse to force by the US-led military coalition fighting 
against the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, or Da’esh) in Iraq and Syria seems 
to fit into a broader trend of  increased parliamentary control over war-and-peace decisions 
on both sides of  the Atlantic. Inasmuch as international legal arguments can and do play a 
role in parliamentary debates and concomitant resolutions, this trend carries the potential 
of  contributing to the compliance pull of  the jus ad bellum. Against this background, the 
article explores to what extent newfound war powers on the part of  national parliaments go 
hand in hand with recourse to international legal arguments. The article engages this ques-
tion through an analysis of  the dialogue between the executive and legislative branches in a 
number of  countries (in particular Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada) pertaining to the participation in the US-led coalition against IS.
1. Introduction
Following the rapid advance of  the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, 
or Da’esh) in Iraq and Syria, and pursuant to a request from Baghdad,1 the United 
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1 Letter dated September 20, 2014, from the Permanent Representative of  Iraq to the United Nations 
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States in September 2014 took the initiative to establish a military coalition conduct-
ing air raids against IS.2 Numerous countries have since joined the coalition, also 
known as Operation “Inherent Resolve,” albeit many states provide logistical support 
or training only.3 Apart from the United States and a range of  Arab countries, several 
Western states decided to actively participate in the offensive against IS by deploying 
aircraft, namely, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. 
Contrary to the US and Arab coalition members, however, the latter countries initially 
limited their actions to Iraqi territory only.4 It was only in the course of  2015–2016 
that these countries gradually expanded their scope of  operations to Syrian territory 
as well.5 While not conducting air raids as such, Germany has also, since December 
2015, provided support to the coalition in the form of  reconnaissance and refuel-
ing aircraft. Combined with ground operations by the Iraqi army, the US-led military 
coalition has contributed substantially to weakening IS and strongly reducing its ter-
ritorial basis. Four years after its initial launch, however, Operation Inherent Resolve 
remains ongoing.
An interesting feature of  the US-led military coalition against IS, and which is 
the focus of  this article, is the high degree of  involvement6 of  national parliaments 
in the decision-making process pertaining to individual states’ participation in this 
coalition. Section 2 explains how there has for some time effectively been a general 
trend toward greater parliamentary involvement in decisions to deploy troops into 
combat situations abroad. Section 3 illustrates how Operation Inherent Resolve 
confirms that trend by examining parliamentary involvement in, and support for, 
decisions in Western states (on both sides of  the Atlantic) to actively take part in 
the US-led coalition against IS. Section 4 subsequently examines how the trend 
toward greater parliamentary control can and does go hand in hand with increased 
recourse to international legal arguments at the domestic level—a development 
which holds the potential of  strengthening the compliance pull of  the international 
2 Further, see Tom Ruys & Nele Verlinden, Digest of  State Practice: 1 July–31 December 2014, 2 J. Use of force 
& Int’l L. 119, 131–145 (2015).
3 For more information, see the webpage of  the Global Coalition against IS, available at http://theglobalco-
alition.org/en/home/.
4 Id. French air raids in Iraq (as of  September 2014) and Syria (as of  September 2015) were stepped up in 
particular in November 2015, following the terrorist attacks in Paris. Following his election late 2015, 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau put an end to Canadian air strike operations in Iraq and Syria early 2016. 
Canada nonetheless continued to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, i.e. through reconnaissance 
missions and refueling sorties. See, e.g., http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-
impact.page.
5 See Tom Ruys, Nele Verlinden, & Luca Ferro, Digest of  State Practice: 1 January–30 June 2015, 2 J. Use of 
force & Int’l L. 257, 279–283 (2015) [hereinafter Ruys et al., Digest of  State Practice: 1 January (2015)]; 
Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro, & Nele Verlinden, Digest of  State Practice: 1 July–31 December 2015, 3 J. Use of force 
& Int’l L. 126, 145–156 (2016) [hereinafter Ruys et al., Digest of  State Practice: 1 July (2016)]; Tom Ruys, 
Luca Ferro, & Nele Verlinden, Digest of  State Practice: 1 January–30 June 2016, 3 J. Use of force & Int’l 
L.290, 303–306 (2016) [hereinafter Digest of  State Practice: 1 January (2016)]; Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro, 
Nele Verlinden, & Carl Vander Maelen, Digest of  State Practice: 1 July–31 December 2016, 4 J. Use of force 
& Int’l L. 161, 179–185 (2017) [hereinafter Ruys et al., Digest of  State Practice: 1 July (2017)].
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legal framework. Finally, section 5 more specifically explores the recourse to inter-
national legal arguments in parliamentary debates in the period 2014–2016 per-
taining to Operation Inherent Resolve, and presents some tentative observations in 
this respect.
It is noted that the analysis of  Operation Inherent Resolve is limited to Western 
members of  the US-led coalition that took or are taking active part in the opera-
tion, in particular by contributing aircraft to the military effort—even though, for 
instance, the parliaments of  Russia and Turkey also gave their respective govern-
ments the green light for purposes of  engaging in military operations in Syria.7 The 
reason for this limitation is threefold. First, coalition members that provide lesser 
degrees of  support or that provide, for instance, training for the Iraqi military, are 
left out of  the equation, since such demarches are normally not caught by the scope 
of  parliamentary war powers (see Appendix 1)—even though they may at times fall 
within the scope of  the prohibition on the use of  force, as reflected in article 2(4) 
of  the United Nations Charter,8 or the broader non-intervention principle under 
customary international law.9 Second, the analysis is limited to genuine parliamen-
tary democracies, specifically those that score at least “high” or “very high” on the 
Global Democracy Ranking.10 As argued in section 5, international legal arguments 
are most likely to be raised, and have an impact, in established democracies. As a 
consequence, parliamentary democracies are the most relevant cases for this article. 
Third, the limitation is inspired by practical considerations, chiefly the public avail-
ability of  parliamentary records and linguistic concerns.11 Appendix 1 provides a 
schematic overview of  parliamentary involvement in military deployments in the 
countries concerned.
7 See Shaun Walker, Russian Parliament Grants Vladimir Putin Right to Deploy Military in Syria, the GUardIan, 
Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/russian-parliament-grants-vladi-
mir-putin-right-to-deploy-military-in-syria; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Authorizing Force: A Review of  Turkish, 
Dutch and French Action, JUst secUrIty, Oct. 16, 2014, https://www.justsecurity.org/16282/authorizing-
force-review-turkish-dutch-french-action/. Note: Russia is not a member of  the US-led coalition but 
has been deploying troops in Syria, with the consent of  the Syrian government in Damascus, since 
September–October 2015. See Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro, & Nele Verlinden, Digest of  State Practice: 1 July–31 
December 2015, J. Use of force & Int’l L. 154–156 (2016). Turkey was initially active in Syria on an auton-
omous basis but joined Operation Inherent Resolve in the summer of  2015. Id. at 141–142.
8 According to article 2(4) UN Charter, “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of  force against the territorial integrity or political independence of  any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of  the United Nations.”
9 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.  United 
States), I.C.J. Reports 14, para. 246 (June 27, 1986).
10 See http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/. This excludes countries such as Turkey, or the Arab and 
North African members of  the US-led coalition. The same result emerges when the analysis is limited to 
“full” or “flawed” democracies in the sense of  the Democracy Index of  the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
See https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index.
11 Since the parliamentary records of  the Danish Parliament, or Folketing, are only available in Danish 
(http://www.ft.dk/), the authors have been unable to directly examine the parliamentary debates in 
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2. The general trend toward increased parliamentary 
involvement in decisions to deploy troops abroad
Already in the 1990s, Lori Fisler Damrosch drew attention to a general trend “towards 
parliamentary control over the decision to introduce troops into situations of  actual 
or potential hostilities.”12 The increasing parliamentary involvement in a domain 
long reserved by and large to the executive branch is evident from the fact that gov-
ernments have frequently sought parliamentary approval or have engaged in more 
frequent consultations with the legislative branch, even in the absence of  a binding 
obligation thereto (at least in the executive’s view13).14 With regard to the 1991 Gulf  
War, Damrosch identified a striking pattern of  parliamentary approvals for decisions 
to commit military support, including votes in the US Congress, the French Assemblée 
Nationale, and the Parliaments of  Italy, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Greece, 
Turkey, and Spain.15 When NATO launched Operation Allied Force against the then 
Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia in 1999, intensive parliamentary deliberations simi-
larly took place in all participating states.16
In the wake of  the 1999 Kosovo intervention and the 2003 US-led intervention in 
Iraq – notably two interventions whose legality under international law was highly 
contested—initiatives were moreover undertaken in various countries to formally 
upgrade national parliaments’ involvement in this domain.17 Thus, in the Netherlands, 
the Constitution was revised in the year 2000, to oblige the government to at least 
inform parliament prior to the deployment of  armed forces abroad.18 In 2005, Spain 
adopted the Ley Defensa Nacional, stipulating that foreign troop deployments that do 
12 Lori Damrosch, Is There a General Trend in Constitutional Democracies Toward Parliamentary Control over 
War-and-Peace Decisions?, 90 asIl ProceedInGs 36, 36 (1996) [hereinafter Damrosch, Control over 
War-and-Peace Decisions]. In a similar vein, see Lori Damrosch, Democratization of  Foreign Policy and 
International Law, 1914–2014, 21 Ilsa J. Int’l & comP. l. 281, 287–288 (2014) [hereinafter Damrosch, 
Democratization].
13 As is well-known, in the United States, subsequent presidents have contested, or at least refrained from 
confirming, the constitutionality of  the US Congress’s so-called War Powers Resolution (Joint Res. con-
cerning the War Powers of  Congress and the President, 50 U.S.C. 1541–1548, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93rd 
Cong., Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (Nov. 7, 1973)). E.g., Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 yale 
J. Int’l l. 67, 74 n. 20, 76 n. 25.
14 See, e.g., Lori Damrosch, The Interface of  National Constitutional Systems with International Law and 
Institutions on Using Military Forces: Changing Trends in Executive and Legislative Powers, in democratIc 
accoUntabIlIty and the Use of force In InternatIonal law 50 (Charlotte Ku & Harold Jacobson eds., 2003); 
Michael Bothe & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, The Dimensions of  Domestic Constitutional and Statutory Limits 
on the Use of  Military Force, in redefInInG sovereIGnty: the Use of force after the cold war 203 (Michael 
Bothe, Mary Ellen O’Connell, & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005).
15 Damrosch, Control over War-and-Peace Decisions, supra note 12, at 37–38.
16 Damrosch, supra note 14, at 55–56.
17 Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, & Cosima Glahn, Parliamentary War Powers around the World, 1989–2004: 
A New Dataset (DFAC Occasional Papers no. 25). Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of  
Armed Forces.
18 A new article 100 was inserted into the Dutch Constitution. See The Netherlands, Raad van State, 
Rijkswet van 22 juni tot verandering in de Grondwet van de bepalingen inzake de verdediging, 22 juni 
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not directly relate to the defense of  Spain or its national interests require the prior 
approval of  the Congreso de los Diputados.19 Furthermore, building upon the German 
Constitutional Court’s 1994 judgment interpreting the Grundgesetz as requiring 
every armed operation to be approved by parliament (notwithstanding the lack of  an 
explicit obligation to this end in the Grundgesetz),20 the Bundestag in 2005 adopted the 
so-called Parliamentary Participation Act, further defining its precise role vis-à-vis the 
deployment of  the armed forces abroad.21 What makes the German case fairly unique, 
moreover, is that the Constitutional Court has on multiple occasions verified whether 
the executive branch complied with its duty to have military operations approved by 
parliament.22 And in France, the Constitution was amended in 2008 to strengthen 
the role of  Parliament, which had hitherto been limited to cases involving a declara-
tion of  war.23 Furthermore, in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, where 
war prerogatives are traditionally reserved exclusively to the executive branch, recent 
governments have repeatedly brought military missions before parliament for votes 
of  support or approval.24 In particular, while a legislative initiative in the UK under 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown25 to consolidate this evolution was not taken further, 
the British government in 2011 “acknowledged that a convention had developed in 
Parliament that before troops were committed, the House of  Commons should have 
an opportunity to debate the matter and said that it proposed to observe that con-
vention except when there was an emergency and such action would not be appro-
priate.”26 Finally, in the United States, rather than to press the outer bounds of  their 
constitutional power, “presidents have tended to seek statutory authorizations to use 
19 Spain, Jefatura del Estado, Ley Orgánica 5/2005, de 17 de noviembre, de la Defensa Nacional, 18 
November 2005, BOE núm. 276, 37717, art. 17(1). If  urgent reasons prevent prior consultation, then 
the government is required to have the Congreso sanction the deployment as soon as possible (art. 17(2)).
20 Germany, Judgment of  the BVerfG of  July 12, 1994, translated in 106 I.L.R. 1, 320 (1994).
21 Germany, Bundestag, Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung bewaffneter 
Streitkräfte im Ausland, March 18, 2005, 1 Bundesgesetzblatt 775.
22 See, e.g., Germany, Judgment of  the BVerfG of  7 May 2008, 2 BvE 1/03, Absatz-Nr. (1–92) (finding that 
the engagement of  German AWACS aircraft in NATO operation Display Deterrence, established to protect 
Turkey in the face of  the US-British intervention in Iraq, should have been authorized by Parliament; 
remark: the events under consideration preceded the entry into force of  the 2005 Parliamentary 
Authorization Act); Germany, Judgment of  the BVerfG of  23 September 2015, 2 BvE 6/11, Absatz-Nr. 
(1–125) (finding that the government was not obliged to retrospectively seek the Bundestag’s approval of  
the completed evacuation of  German citizens from Libya early 2011).
23 France, Congrès, Loi constitutionelle No. 2008–724 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve 
République, 24 July 2008, Journal Officiel de la République Française, NOR: JUSX0807076L (amending 
article 35 of  the French Constitution of  September 28, 1958).
24 Philippe Lagassé, Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations 
in Institutional Change and Legislative Control, 70 ParlIamentary aff. 280, 280 (2017).
25 See United Kingdom, House of  Lords and House of  Commons–Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional 
Renewal Bill, Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill. Volume I: Report, July 31, 2008, http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtconren/166/166.pdf.
26 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual, October 2011, para. 5.38, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/cabinet-manual. Further, Claire Mills, Parliamentary Approval for Deploying 
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force when engaging in conflicts of  any magnitude, particularly those involving large-
scale use of  ground troops.”27
Several factors may account for the growing involvement of  the legislative branch 
in these matters. Such factors may include, for instance, national parliaments’ lev-
erage through their “power of  the purse,”28 or the increased awareness on the part 
of  the executive branch, in an age where the domestic public has become ever more 
casualty-averse and increasingly sensitive to reports of  collateral damage reported in 
the media, of  the importance of  a public and transparent process of  legislative delib-
eration, which can help prepare the polity to accept the risks and burdens of  military 
involvement.29 The controversy surrounding the 2003 Iraq intervention, which in 
several countries left domestic constituencies and their elected representatives with 
the feeling that there was insufficient deliberation and that they had been misled, 
arguably played a catalyst role.30 The 2003 intervention in Iraq notably spurred the 
creation of  national commissions of  inquiry, tasked with critically examining the deci-
sion to intervene, including by scrutinizing the interaction between the executive and 
legislative branches.31
Notwithstanding this trend, it is evident that democracies still exhibit consider-
able variation in the actual involvement of  parliaments in military deployment deci-
sions—parliamentary “involvement” in foreign troop deployments indeed means 
different things in different countries. First, in some countries, national (constitu-
tional) law stipulates that parliament must be informed (only) after an operation has 
been launched (Belgium), or must be informed and “consulted” prior to a foreign troop 
deployment (the Netherlands). In other countries, military operations abroad must 
be formally approved by the legislature from the very outset (Germany, Denmark), or 
must be approved if  the operation continues past a certain duration (e.g. 60/90 days 
in the United States).32 In France, the Elysée must inform parliament about troop 
deployment decisions within three days after the beginning of  an operation but 
requires parliamentary authorization for purposes of  prolonging operations beyond a 
period of  four months. While in most continental European countries, as well as in the 
USA, parliamentary war powers are defined in the national constitution or separate 
27 Ingber, supra note 13, at 74.
28 See, e.g., Heiner Hänggi, The Use of  Force under International Auspices: Parliamentary Accountability and 
“Democratic Deficits”, in the “doUble democratIc defIcIt”: ParlIamentary accoUntabIlIty and the Use of force 
Under InternatIonal aUsPIces 13 (Hans Born & Heiner Hänggi eds., 2004).
29 Damrosch, supra note 14, at 40; Louis Henkin, how natIons behave: law and foreIGn PolIcy 64 (2d ed. 
1979).
30 Damrosch, Democratization, supra note 12, at 288, 292.
31 See, e.g., The Netherlands, Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak, Rapport (2010), also available 
at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids. See 
also on the UK’s Iraq Inquiry (or “Chilcott Inquiry”): http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/, in particular sec-
tion 3.8, “Development of  UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003,” on parliamentary approval 
for military action (at 559–571) and section 5, “Advice on the Legal Basis for Military Action, November 
2002 to March 2003,” on the debate as to the legality of  the operation.
32 See § 5(b) of  the War Powers resolution. Sections 2 and 4, moreover, contain a duty of  prior (“in every 
possible instance”) and periodic consultation with Congress (within 48 hours of  the launch of  an opera-
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legislation, as mentioned above in the United Kingdom an unwritten “convention” 
has recently emerged according to which Parliament must be consulted ahead of  for-
eign troop deployment decisions. A  de facto practice of  consulting Parliament and 
holding votes for combat missions has moreover taken hold in Canada, albeit that 
successive governments have insisted that this practice should not be understood to 
reflect a legal obligation.33
Second, it must also be recalled that the “trigger” of  parliamentary war powers 
(inasmuch as they exist) may differ strongly from one country to another—and does 
not necessarily coincide with the scope of  application of  the prohibition on the use of  
force in article 2(4) of  the UN Charter. Apart from the existence of  thresholds in terms 
of  the duration of  an operation (see Appendix 1), the type of  acts that trigger parlia-
mentary “war powers” may also diverge. The Belgian Constitution, for instance still 
links the duty to inform parliament to the occurrence of  a “state of  war,” thus clinging 
on to a vocabulary that has by and large been abandoned in international law.34 By 
contrast, in other countries, the role of  parliament is linked to the deployment of  the 
armed forces in “armed operations,” “combat missions,” or “offensive military opera-
tions” (compare Germany, Canada, and the UK).35 The US War Powers Resolution 
refers to the introduction of  US Armed Forces into “hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” (section 
2(a)). The Danish Constitution refers to the “use of  military force against any foreign 
State” (section 19(2)).
Third, parliamentary “war powers” (anachronistic though that epithet may be) are 
seldom absolute: even where national parliaments must be consulted or must formally 
authorize troop deployments abroad, exception is often (and understandably) made—
whether in domestic legislation or case law—for situations of  urgency—e.g. to defend 
the state against an armed attack—or situations that require a degree of  secrecy.36
In the end, whatever the reasons, and notwithstanding the various shapes it takes 
at the domestic level, the trend toward increased parliamentary involvement is clear. 
As is explained in the following section, this trend moreover finds confirmation in the 
national decision-making processes in western states pertaining to their participation 
in Operation Inherent Resolve.
33 See Lagassé, supra note 24, at 296 (observing that the trend has been more “ambiguous” than in the UK).
34 In the jus ad/contra bellum (international law on the use of  force), what matters is the occurrence of  a 
“use of  force,” or—for purposes of  ascertaining the application of  the right of  self-defense —an “armed 
attack.” With the adoption of  the UN Charter, the former concepts replaced the language of  “war” that is 
still in use in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. In the jus in bello (law of  armed conflict), the language of  war 
was replaced by that of  “armed conflict” as a result of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
35 See, e.g., German Parliamentary Participation Act § 2 [Ein Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte liegt vor, 
wenn Soldatinnen oder Soldaten der Bundeswehr in bewaffnete Unternehmungen einbezogen sind oder eine 
Einbeziehung in eine bewaffnete Unternehmung zu erwarten ist]. On Canada and the UK, see, e.g., Lagassé, 
supra note 24, at 289, 294.
36 See, for instance, dUtch const., art. 100(2), which provides that in case urgent reasons prevent the gov-
ernment from informing parliament prior to the actual deployment, information must nonetheless be 
provided as soon as possible. The German Parliamentary Participation Act in turn envisages a system of  
ex post facto authorization in situations of  urgency. For relevant case law of  the Bundestag, see supra note 
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3. National parliaments and the participation of  Western 
States in the US-led coalition against IS: An overview
When, preceding the launch of  Operation Inherent Resolve, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States in August–September 2013 hinted at possible air strikes 
against the Assad regime in reaction to a chemical weapons attack near Damascus,37 
British Prime Minister Cameron decided to seek the approval of  the House of  Commons 
for a military operation, notwithstanding the absence of  a statutory obligation to this 
end. Remarkably, the motion was defeated by 285 votes to 272. In what some regarded 
as a gross political miscalculation on the part of  Downing Street, the British parlia-
ment thus rejected government military action for the first time since 1782 (at the 
time of  the US war on independence). Cameron accepted his defeat, acknowledging 
that Parliament “[did] not wish to see British military action.”38 Until the launch of  
the US-led operation against IS in the second half  of  2014, the UK Foreign Secretary 
would assert that “Britain will not be taking part in any air strikes in Syria. We have 
already had that discussion in our parliament last year and we won’t be revisiting that 
position.”39
On the other side of  the Atlantic too, President Obama in September 2013 sought 
approval from Congress on a temporary “Authorization for the Use of  Military 
Force against the Government of  Syria to Respond to Use of  Chemical Weapons.”40 
Although President Obama repeatedly asserted that he was not legally required to 
seek Congressional approval, faced with political pressure, he nonetheless considered 
that “it was right in the absence of  a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take 
this debate to Congress.”41 While the resolution was approved by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, it reportedly faced strong opposition in the full Senate as well 
as in the House of  Representatives.42 Eventually, plans for military strikes against the 
Assad regime were shelved after Russia brokered a diplomatic deal over the destruction 
37 Ben Hubbard, Mark Mazzetti, & Mark Landler, Blasts in the Night, a Smell, and a Flood of  Syrian Victims, the 
new york tImes, Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/blasts-in-the-
night-a-smell-and-a-flood-of-syrian-victims.html.
38 Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, bbc news, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-23892783. Further, Juliet Kaarbo & Daniel Kenealy, No, Prime Minister: Explaining the 
House of  Commons’ Vote on Intervention in Syria, 25 eUr. secUrIty 28 (2015).
39 S. Brown & E.  Kirschbaum, Germany, Britain Say Won’t Take Part in Anti-IS Air Strikes in Syria, 
reUters, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/11/iraq-crisis-germany-britain- 
idUSB4N0QV00920140911.
40 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joint Res. to authorize the limited and specified use of  the United 
States Armed Forces against Syria, S.J. Res., 113th Cong., 1st Sess., (Sept. 6, 2013).
41 See, e.g., United States, White House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
Syria, Sept. 10, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/
remarks-president-address-nation-syria.
42 E.g., Karen DeYoung & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Sets Aside Authorization Resolution, the washInGton Post, Sept. 
12, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senate-sets-aside-resolution-on-
military-strike-against-syria/2013/09/11/428887bc-1b19-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html; 
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of  Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. The decision to go to Congress has nonetheless 
been considered “perplexing” given that “all of  the available evidence suggests that 
Obama would have lost, and lost badly, any congressional vote on military action.”43
With regard to the actual US-led coalition against IS in Iraq and Syria launched 
one year later, the executive branches in numerous countries again turned to the leg-
islative branch for support. Unlike the proposed recourse to force against the Assad 
regime, the quest for parliamentary backing proved much more successful this time 
around. For example, both in Belgium44 and Canada,45 the executive branch in 2014 
sought—and obtained—the approval of  the legislative branch for military actions in 
Iraq, even though in neither country this was constitutionally required. Later on, the 
government’s plan to expand military operations to Syria was similarly submitted to, 
and approved by, their respective parliaments.46
Similarly, the Danish deployment in Iraq and, two years later, in Syria also obtained 
the green light from parliament.47 Moreover, both the British and German govern-
ments obtained parliamentary approval for operations in Iraq,48 and subsequently for 
expanding military action to Syria.49 In accordance with article 35 of  the Constitution, 
the French government informed the Assemblée Nationale shortly after its decision to 
strike IS targets in Iraq50 and received permission from parliament to continue its air 
campaign after the expiry of  the four-month deadline (see Appendix 1).51 The same 
procedure was repeated when France expanded aerial sorties to Syrian territory.52 In 
the Netherlands, the government informed parliament of  its decision to participate in 
43 Kenneth Mayer, Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision to seek Congressional 
Authorization for a Military Attack against Syria: Implications for Theories of  Unilateral Action, 4 Utah l. rev. 
829 (2014).
44 Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Résolution sur la Situation en Irak et la Participation de la Belgique 
à la Coalition Internationale contre l’EI, Sept. 26, 2014, Parl. Doc. 54, 0305/004, 3.
45 Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Vote No. 252, Oct. 7, 2014 (157 in favor, 134 against).
46 Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Vote No. 368, Mar. 30, 2015 (142 in favor, 129 
against); Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Résolution relative à l’engagement de la Défense belge 
contre l’État islamique (EI ou DAECH) en Irak et en Syrie, June 30, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54, 1883/006.
47 Danish Parliament Approves Air Strikes against IS in Iraq, chIna daIly, Oct. 2, 2014, http://www.china-
daily.com.cn/world/2014-10/02/content_18693430.htm; Denmark, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Broad 
Support in the Danish Parliament Making Denmark a Frontrunner in the Fight against Da’esh, Apr. 19, 2016, 
http://um.dk/en/news/NewsDisplayPage/?newsID=A8B901DC-845E-4690-930F-CDF5E4B5A130.
48 United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Sept. 26, 2014, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate 
(524 in favor, 43 against); Germany, Bundestag, Annahme der Beschlussempfehlung auf  Drucksache 
18/3857, Jan. 29, 2015 (457 in favor, 79 against, 54 abstentions).
49 United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Dec. 2, 2015, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate 
(397 in favor, 223 against); Germany, Bundestag, Annahme der Beschlussempfehlung auf  Drucksache 
18/6912, Dec. 4, 2015 (445 in favor, 145 against, 7 abstentions).
50 France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Troisième Session Extraordinaire de 2013–2014, 
Première Séance, Sept. 24, 2014.
51 France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Vote en Application de l’Article 35, Alinéa 3, de la 
Constitution, Session Ordinaire de 2014–2015, January 13, 2015 (488 in favor, 1 against).
52 France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Deuxième Session Extraordinaire de 2014–2015, 
Première Séance, Sept. 15, 2015; France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Vote en Application de 
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the coalition against IS, on Iraqi soil, pursuant to article 100 of  the Constitution in 
September 2014.53 It did the same with regard to the expansion of  military operations 
to Syria on January 29, 2016.54
Meanwhile in the United States, President Obama insisted that existing Statutes 
– specifically the 2001 Authorization for Use of  Military Force resolution (AUMF), 
adopted by Congress in the wake of  the 9/11 terrorist attacks—implicitly provided 
him with ample authority under domestic law to engage in airstrikes against IS in Iraq 
and Syria.55 Interestingly, in spite hereof, President Obama nevertheless submitted a 
proposal to Congress on February 11, 2015, for a new resolution expressly autho-
rizing the use of  military force against IS.56 Amidst political opposition on both sides 
of  the aisle, however, the proposal was not taken further in Congress.57 Subsequent 
attempts to amend or appeal the AUMF have remained without success. Meanwhile, 
Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the ongoing conflict.58
Only in Australia, where there is neither domestic legislation nor any unwritten 
“convention” providing for any (even modest) war powers on the part of  the legislative 
branch,59 was parliament completely kept out of  the decision-making process: neither 
53 The Netherlands, Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Defensie, en Buitenlandse Handel en 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Artikel 100-brief  deelneming aan internationale strijd tegen ISIS, 24 
September 2014, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 506.
54 The Netherlands, Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Defensie en Buitenlandse Handel en 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Aanvullende artikel 100-brief  Nederlandse bijdrage aan de strijd tegen 
ISIS, Jan. 29, 2016, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 570.
55 This argument is based on the idea that (i) the 2001 AUMF resolution authorizes the use of  force against 
“those nations, organizations, or persons [which the President determines] planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided [the 9/11 attacks], or harboured such organizations or persons” (Joint Res. to Authorize 
the Use of  United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched 
against the United States, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 
18, 2001))—a phrase which the executive branch understands as referring to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
and “associated forces,” and that (ii) IS is in a sense a “spin-off ” of  al-Qaeda. See, e.g., United States, 
White House, Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks guiding the United States’ Use of  Military 
Force and related National Security Operations, Dec. 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf, 4ff.
56 United States, White House, Letter from the President to the Congress of  the United States—Authorization 
for the Use of  United States Armed Forces in connection with the Islamic State of  Iraq and the Levant, 
Feb. 11, 2015, Annex, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-pres-
ident-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection. Further, see Ruys et al., Digest of  State 
Practice: 1 January 2015, supra note 5, at 294–295.
57 Against the background of  the impending US presidential elections, it would seem that the opposition 
was influenced both by concerns that a new resolution might overly tie the hands of  the incoming presi-
dent, as well as concerns that it might give the incoming president free reign. See, e.g., Patricia Zengerle, 
Senate Democrats Oppose “Blank Check” for Islamic State Fight, reUters, March 11, 2015, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-congress-democrats-idUSKBN0M71HV20150312; Jonathan 
Ernst, Obama Request for Islamic State Fight Won’t Pass US House: Top Republican, reUters, April 13, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/us-mideast-crisis-congress-idUSKBN0N41Q320150413; Charles Tiefer & 
Kathleen Clark, Congressional and Presidential War Powers as a Dialogue: Analysis of  the Syrian and 
ISIS Conflicts, Washington University in St. Louis School of  Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-07-
06 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2812192.
58 Ingber, supra note 13, at 69.
59 Australia Parliament, Parliamentary Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Forces Overseas—Background 
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the initial Australian participation in 2014 nor the expansion of  the scope of  opera-
tions to Syrian territory in September 2015 led to any form of  consultation by the 
government of  the legislative branch (beyond a mere notification)—to the ostensible 
discontent of  an independent MP, the Green Party, and later (in 2015)  also of  the 
Labour opposition.60 In all, the Australia case strikes as the exception that proves the 
rule.
4. Parliamentary involvement and the relevance of  
international legal considerations in domestic use of  force 
decisions
The importance of  the outlined trend toward increased parliamentary war powers 
should not be underestimated. Stronger parliamentary involvement is certainly de-
sirable from a democratic oversight perspective (even if  governments need to preserve 
sufficient leeway to respond (in self-defense) when the state is confronted with an 
armed attack, or when there is a need for urgent hostage rescue operations or non-
combatant evacuation operations). It increases the democratic accountability of  the 
government’s actions in the international arena. While it may usefully assist the ex-
ecutive in garnering the symbolic capital it needs to legitimize military operations 
abroad, turning to parliament can have other important repercussions as well. In the 
extreme, as in the UK in 2013, it may force the executive (if  not legally, than at least 
politically) to abandon (at least temporarily) envisaged deployments. More often, the 
legitimacy benefit derived from a parliamentary endorsement may come at the cost 
of  more or less far-reaching restrictions in terms of  the locus of  deployment (consider 
the original parliamentary resolutions in Belgium and Canada authorizing military 
action against IS in Iraq only), the duration of  the deployment,61 the number of  troops, 
etc., which the government will be unable (whether for domestic legal or political rea-
sons) to set aside at a later stage without again turning to parliament.
Furthermore, if  governments decide to seek parliamentary approval absent a for-
mal legal obligation thereto, such practice arguably creates certain expectations 
on the part of  parliament and the domestic audience in general. In particular, the 
British Government’s defeat over military action in Syria in August 2013 “arguably 
strengthened [the] emerging convention [to consult the House of  Commons], with 
many commentators suggesting that any future significant deployment of  the Armed 
Forces would now be inconceivable without prior recourse to Parliament.”62 The epi-
sode thus resulted in an “informal veto” on the part of  the House of  Commons over 
60 See, e.g., Australia House of  Representatives, 1st Sess., 4th Period, Sept. 3, 2014, Official Hansard No. 
14 (2014), at 9678 (Andrew Damien Wilkie, independent MP); Australia, House of  Representatives, 1st 
Sess., 7th Period, Sept. 9, 2015, Official Hansard No. 13 (2015), at 9710 (Adam Paul Bandt, Australian 
Greens) and 9641 (William Richard Shorten, Australian Labour Party).
61 Consider, for example, the deadline of  December 31, 2016, in the approval granted by the Bundestag in 
December 2015.











12   I•CON (2019), 1–33
the exercise of  the executive’s military deployment prerogative.63 Absent formal rec-
ognition or incorporation of  such upgraded role for the legislative branch, the trend is, 
however, not necessarily linear in each and every country. Thus, in Canada, while the 
executive branch admittedly continued the practice of  consulting parliament ahead of  
launching combat operations, both the Harper and Trudeau governments were keen 
to stress that there was no constitutional, statutory or even conventional obligation to 
this end.64 Similarly, while the Belgian demissionary cabinets sought parliamentary 
approval for participation in multilateral operations in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014), 
after new elections were held the successor government took the position that parlia-
mentary approval was not legally required in order to expand the Belgian operations 
against IS to Syrian territory (although the Chambre des Représentants did vote a reso-
lution supporting the expansion).65 This was denounced by one MP as “turning back 
the clock.”66 By the same token, US President Obama’s initial efforts to seek approval 
from Congress for military operations against the Assad regime in 2013 (following the 
chemical weapons attack near Damascus) were not reiterated when President Trump 
ordered an air strike against a Syrian airbase in April 2017.67 Nor were the respec-
tive national parliaments consulted when the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom conducted similar strikes against Syrian installations in April 2018.68
63 Lagassé, supra note 24, at 289.
64 Id. at 295 (citing the defense minister of  the Harper government) and 296 (referring to the reassertion by 
PM Trudeau of  “the exclusive role of  the executive in military matters”).
65 Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Commissions Réunies des Relations Extérieures et de la Défense 
Nationale, Compte Rendu Intégral, May 18, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54 COM 425, para. 01.04 (Karolien 
Grosemans): “The decision regarding deployment in Syria remains, from a strictly legal point of  view, a gov-
ernment prerogative. This is also stated in Article 167 of  the Constitution. The government has the exclusive 
competence to expand the mission and to deploy our F-16s in Syria.” (translation provided by the authors).
66 Id., para. 01.01 (Wouter De Vriendt) (translation provided by the authors).
67 Jeryl Bier, White House: Trump Does Not Need Congressional Approval to Strike Syria, the weekly standard, 
June 30, 2017, http://www.weeklystandard.com/white-house-trump-does-not-need-congressional-
approval-to-strike-syria/article/2008682; Hubbard, Mazzetti, & Landler, supra note 37.
68 Tom Ruys, Carl Vander Maelen, & Sebastiaan Van Severen, Digest of  State Practice: 1 January–30 June 2018, 
5 J. Use of force & Int’l l. 324, 352–368 (2018). See, e.g., Tanzil Chowdhury, How the Recent Strikes on Syria 
Undermine UK Constitutional Controls on Military Action, law of natIons, Apr. 23, 2018, https://lawofna-
tionsblog.com/2018/04/23/recent-strikes-syria-undermine-uk-constitutional-controls-military-action/. 
Note: in the immediate aftermath of  the April 2018 strikes, the House of  Commons library did produce 
a briefing paper, finding that the doctrine of  humanitarian intervention—relied upon by the UK govern-
ment—remains controversial and that legal opinion is divided (Richard Ware, The Legal Basis for Air Strikes 
against Syrian Government Targets, UK House of  Commons Briefing Paper CBP-8287 (Apr. 16, 2018), 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8287/CBP-8287.pdf). The research ser-
vice of  the German Bundestag for its part produced a report at the request of  several left-wing MPs quali-
fying the strikes in Syria as unlawful acts of  reprisal (Germany, Bundestag—Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 
Völkerrechtliche Implikationen des amerikanisch-britisch-franzözischen Militärschlags vom 14. April 2018 
gegen Chemiewaffeneinrichtungen in Syrien, April 18, 2018, https://www.bundestag.de/blob/551344/
f8055ab0bba0ced333ebcd8478e74e4e/wd-2-048-18-pdf-data.pdf/. The British House of  Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, moreover, decided to conduct an inquiry into the legality of  humanitarian inter-
ventions in subsequent months (ultimately siding with the British government in spite of  “divisions in legal 
opinion,” while simultenaously calling upon the government to further clarify the general conditions for 
when a humanitarian intervention can take place). UK, House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
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Another consequence is that, as governments are increasingly compelled to present 
their case for military deployment before parliament, they cannot restrict their plead-
ings to political arguments, dealing with the economic costs or the risk of  casualties, 
but will also couch their arguments in legal terms. Indeed, although parliaments are 
by nature political bodies and although the voting behavior of  individual members 
can to a great extent be determined by their political affiliation, legal considerations 
may play a role. This means in the first place that possible constitutional and statutory 
limitations will be addressed, adding to their significance.69 International law is also 
likely to play its part in parliamentary debates. In fact, different strands of  interna-
tional relations research suggest a connection between the impact of  international 
law, including international law on the use of  force, and parliamentary involvement 
in this matter. More specifically, theories of  democratic peace and scholarship on the 
domestic impact of  international norms suggest that parliamentary involvement in 
military deployment decisions goes hand in hand with recourse to international legal 
arguments.
First of  all, research that builds on liberal theories of  democratic peace suggests 
that international legal considerations will have greater bearing on military deploy-
ment decisions if  parliaments are involved in the decision-making process. In line 
with the central proposition of  democratic peace theory that democracies do not fight 
each other in interstate wars, liberal international relations theorists have argued 
that “liberal democracies are more likely to ‘do law’ with one another.”70 Gaubatz, for 
example, argues that the distinctive domestic institutions and preferences of  democra-
cies enhance the strength of  their international commitments.71 Given that “respect 
for law is a critical component of  democratic political culture,” respect for interna-
tional legal rules will also have “at least significant rhetorical appeal in democratic 
polities.”72 This is confirmed by a recent study of  Kreps and Wallace, which shows that 
the inconsistency of  drone warfare with international legal principles had a negative 
impact on public support for drone strikes.73
Taubman agrees that democratic publics prefer their governments to keep their 
treaty promises, and claims that this results in “a generalized commitment to inter-
national law and international institutions” because democratic structures give 
voice to domestic opposition and ensure that leaders remain accountable to public 
opinion.74 This corresponds to the assumption of  the structural model of  democratic 
peace that the domestic institutions of  established democracies are crucial for linking 
69 Bothe & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 14, at 198.
70 Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 yale l.J. 2599, 2632 (1997); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the Effectiveness of  International Adjudication, 89 ProceedInGs of annUal 
meetInG asIl 91 (1995).
71 Kurt Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations, 50 Int’l orG. 109 (1996).
72 Id. at 119.
73 Sarah Kreps & Geoffrey Wallace, International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone 
Strikes, 53 J. Peace res. 830 (2016).
74 Jarrett Taubman, Towards a Theory of  Democratic Compliance: Security Council Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
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public attitudes to foreign policy.75 Recent work on “parliamentary peace” suggests 
that parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions is a particularly 
important determinant in this regard.76 More specifically, parliamentary debates open 
up “intra-governmental decision-making to public scrutiny” and force “governments 
to give reasons for political decisions complying with the fundamental norms of  the 
society and the identity of  the nation.”77 In consequence, national parliaments can be 
expected to have a decisive role in linking the popular preference for respect for inter-
national law with actual compliance with international legal rules.
Second, and in line with the latter expectation, research on the impact of  norms in 
international politics suggests that a state’s domestic political structure is an impor-
tant determinant for compliance with international norms.78 Domestic institutions 
determine which actors have access to decision-making processes and, hereby, how 
norms are empowered domestically. If  domestic institutions, like parliaments, open 
up decision-making to societal actors, elites are expected to be faced with “pressure 
from below” to comply with international norms.79 Likewise, Cortell and Davis expect 
executives to “appeal to international norms in an effort to further their own preferred 
strategy or to block those of  other officials” if  “decision making is dispersed across 
several functionally differentiated arms of  the government.”80 In a case study of  the 
impact of  the collective security norm on the US response to Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait, 
Cortell and Davis describe how the involvement of  parliaments in military deployment 
decisions enhance compliance with international norms.81
To sum up, theories of  democratic peace and literature on international norms sug-
gest a link between the impact of  international legal rules on military deployment 
decisions and parliamentary involvement in this matter. Indeed, the dialogue between 
the executive and legislative branch can be expected to create another channel where 
(national and international) legal arguments are exchanged as a form of  justificatory 
discourse. Even if  the arguments made will not of  course be exclusively, or necessarily 
primordially, legal in nature, and even if  it is not excluded that this discourse may, at 
75 Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of  Democratic Peace, 1946–1986, 87 am. Pol. 
scI. rev. 624 (1993); Håvard Hegre, Democracy and Armed Conflict, 51 J. Peace res. 159 (2014).
76 See, e.g., PatrIck mello, democratIc PartIcIPatIon In armed conflIct mIlItary Involvement In kosovo, afGhanIstan 
and Iraq (2014); Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, & Stefan Marschall, Bringing Democracy Back 
In: The Democratic Peace, Parliamentary War Powers and European Participation in the 2003 Iraq War, 50 
cooPeratIon & conflIct 87 (2015); Dan Reiter & Erik Tillman, Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints 
on the Democratic Initiation of  Conflict, 64 J. Pol. 810 (2002).
77 Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, & Stefan Marschall, Strengthening Parliamentary “War Powers” in 
Europe: Lessons from 25 National Parliaments, DFAC Policy Paper, 4 (2008a); Dieterich et al., supra note 
76, at 99.
78 Jeffrey Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist—Constructivist Divide, 3 
eUr. J. Int’l rel. 473, 480 (1997); Andrew Cortell & James Davis Jr., Understanding the Domestic Impact of  
International Norms: A Research Agenda, 2 Int’l stUd. rev. 65, 66 (2000).
79 Id. at 477.
80 Andrew Cortell & James Davis Jr., How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of  
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times, amount to little more than an exercise in semantics,82 or a dialogue des sourds, the 
reference to the international legal framework governing interstate recourse to force 
(the so-called jus ad bellum) potentially adds to what Harold Koh has called the legal 
and political “internalization”83 of  these norms at the domestic level.84 These forms of  
internalization contribute to the compliance pull of  the jus ad bellum by urging execu-
tive organs to provide an adequate justification for their actions at the domestic level, 
including in terms of  conformity with international law. The importance of  this justi-
ficatory discourse is all the greater when, for whatever reason, no similar debate takes 
place at the international level, in particular when no meaningful exchange of  legal 
arguments takes place within the UN Security Council.85
Evidence over the past 15 to 20 years corroborates the suggestion that “[p]arlia-
ments and public opinion are increasingly concerned to connect constitutional 
decisions on war powers with the international legal appraisal of  a military commit-
ment.”86 By way of  illustration, in relation to the discussions within the German par-
liament on the possible participation of  German forces in NATO’s Operation Allied 
Force, Simma observed that “the international legal issues involved were discussed 
at great length and in considerable depth. The respect for UN Charter law demon-
strated throughout the debates was remarkable.”87 The 1999 NATO intervention in 
the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia and the 2003 Iraq intervention also inspired other 
parliamentary assemblies to have a closer look at questions of  international law.88 The 
Foreign Affairs Committee of  the UK House of  Commons undertook an in-depth study 
of  the alleged right of  unilateral humanitarian intervention (absent Security Council 
82 Consider, for instance, the absolute refusal of  the Obama administration to speak of  “war” during the 
military operations in Libya in 2011, spawning numerous online parodies including “Make love, not 
time-limited, scope-limited military actions!” See Ross Douthat, A War by Any Name, the new york tImes, 
Mar. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/opinion/28douthat.html.
83 Koh, supra note 70, at 2656–2657: “Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an 
international norm, and adopt it as a matter of  government policy. Legal internalization occurs when 
an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial 
interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of  the three.”
84 Alternatively, from a constructivist viewpoint it might be argued that it contributes to embedding these 
norms in the identity of  the social actors involved (states).
85 This was, for example, the case in relation to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. See also Ruys 
et al., Digest of  State Practice: 1 January (2015), supra note 5, at 276–277.
86 Damrosch, Democratization, supra note 12, at 287.
87 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of  Force: Legal Aspects, 10 eUr. J. Int’l l. 1, 12–13 (1999). See 
Germany, Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/248, Oct. 16, 1998; Germany, Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 
14/8, Nov. 19, 1998.
88 Consider, for example, the thematic debate on the legality of  preventive self-defense in the Commission 
for External Affairs of  the Belgian Senate, which took place during the drafting phase of  a resolution 
on UN reform in February–May 2015. See Belgium, Senate, La Réforme des Nations Unies: Rapport Fait 
au nom de la Commission des Relations Extérieures et de la Défense par Mme. Annane et M. Galand, 
May 24, 2005, Doc. 3-1028/1. On the role of  the international law on the use of  force in the debates of  
the Belgian Parliament on the interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), see Eric David, La 
Pratique du Pouvoir Exécutive et le Contrôle des Chambers Législatives en matière de Droit International (1999–
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authorization) in 2000.89 The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of  the Canadian 
Senate concluded that the lack of  UN authorization for Operation Allied Force set 
an unfortunate precedent and recommended that if  a permanent member were to 
veto a resolution authorizing military intervention in the face of  grave and large-
scale human rights violations, then the authority of  the General Assembly should be 
sought on the precedent of  the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.90 In the Netherlands, 
the Commission of  Inquiry set up after the Iraq war paid considerable attention to the 
compatibility of  the intervention with international law.91 Again, in the course of  the 
Chilcott inquiry in the UK, “an unprecedented amount of  attention has been given to 
differences of  views on the questions of  international law involved in the matter.”92 
In their recent volume on British war powers, Fikfak and Hooper also note a strik-
ing pervasiveness of  international legal language in the dialogue between the British 
government and parliament, whereby the law increasingly takes center stage. In fact, 
the authors go as far as to express regret that the “straitjacket that law and legalistic 
language imposes” stifles much-needed discussion over the policy questions which 
parliament is constitutionally mandated to ask.93
If  this form of  political and legal “internalization” of  the jus ad bellum may con-
tribute to its compliance pull, this does not necessarily imply that international legal 
considerations will ultimately prevail and that breaches of  the UN Charter framework 
will necessarily be avoided. Several British scholars have, for instance, suggested that 
an inverse proportional relationship exists between the clarity of  the international 
legal basis for military intervention (e.g. in the form of  an explicit UNSC authoriza-
tion) and the UK Government’s inclination to seek parliamentary support, implying 
a the risk that parliamentary involvement is seen as a mechanism to sidestep the UN 
framework and facilitate unilateralism.94 It is obvious that national parliaments have 
not shied away at times from endorsing military interventions that were of  dubious 
89 United Kingdom, House of  Commons–Foreign Affairs Committee, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Further 
Memorandum on the International Law Aspects, 4th Report, June 2000, republished in (2000), 49 
I.C.L.Q. 878. See also The Netherlands, Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen, Rapport, Sept. 
4, 2000, Handelingen, TK 1999–2000, 26454, nr. 8, 287–384.
90 Canada, Senate—Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, The New NATO and the Evolution of  
Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada, April 2000, 7th Report, 34, http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/
commbus/senate/Com-e/FORE-E/REP-E/rep07apr00-e.htm.
91 The Netherlands, Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak, Rapport, supra note 31, at 215ff.
92 Damrosch, Democratization, supra note 12, at 288. See also supra note 31. Further, see James Green & 
Stephen Samuel, The Chilcott Report: Some Thoughts on International Law and Legal Advice, 22 J. conflIct & 
secUrIty l. 333, 335–341 (2016) (“International law was . . . a key element to the Inquiry’s Report. The 
Inquiry’s commitment to international legal accuracy and clarity is evident throughout.” Id. at 339–
340). Note: the Chilcott report contains a 169-page chapter on the advice on the legal basis of  the Iraqi 
intervention. It does not, however, draw explicit conclusions on the legality of  the 2003 intervention in 
Iraq as such.
93 veronIka fIkfak & hayley J. hooPer, ParlIament’s secret war 18, 20, 28, 32, 48, 56 ff. (2018).
94 Id. at 18, 25–28 (pointing at a “hierarchy of  fora’” whereby parliamentary involvement is regarded as 
a tool to fill the lacuna in legitimacy that exists where no clear international mandate is present); Colin 
Murray & Aoife O’Donoghue, Towards Unilateralism? House of  Commons Oversight of  the Use of  Force, 65 
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legality and/or that have been denounced as unlawful by many states and by a clear 
majority of  legal opinion,95 or from confining themselves to a “rubber stamp” type of  
endorsement.96 The relationship between both branches is also marked by an endemic 
asymmetry in terms of  access to sensitive information,97 and, possibly, in terms of  
relevant legal expertise, which weakens the position of  the lawmakers. International 
legal considerations may also retreat in the background when a nation rallies together 
after having been the victim of  a heinous terrorist attack (whether in Paris, in Sousse, 
or in Istanbul).98 It follows that increased parliamentary scrutiny is no guarantee for 
strict compliance with the jus ad bellum. It is moreover recalled that often the “trigger” 
of  parliamentary war powers does not coincide exactly with the scope of  application 
of  the jus ad bellum (see Appendix 1). In particular, minor cross-border uses of  force, 
while nonetheless caught by article 2(4) of  the UN Charter, may not require any con-
sultation with, or approval by, the national parliament concerned. Interestingly, how-
ever, in one of  the rare direct studies on the use of  international law in parliamentary 
debates, focusing on the debates in the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados regarding the 
1999 NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia and the 2003 Iraq war, 
Marrero Rocha confirms that, even if  the arguments and voting behavior of  members 
of  parliament are largely guided by partisan interests, international law may provide a 
useful mechanism to control governments’ external policy.99 Still, the impact of  inter-
national law arguments on the decision-making process cannot be taken for granted 
and merits further research.
5. International legal considerations in parliamentary 
debates on the coalition against IS: Tentative observations
As with previous military deployments, in numerous democratic states the inter-branch 
dialogue with regard to Operation Inherent Resolve has compelled governments to 
95 Reference can be made to the approval of  the 2003 Iraq intervention by US Congress (US Senate and 
House of  Representatives, Authorization for Use of  Military Force against Iraq Resolution of  2002), H.R.J. 
Res. 114, Pub. L. No. 107–243, 116 Stat. 1497–1502 (Oct. 10, 2002)) or the approval by the Russian 
Duma of  the 2014 intervention in the Crimean peninsula (Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment 
in Ukraine, bbc news, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035). As to the for-
mer intervention, it is recalled that in the run-up to the intervention, numerous states and scholars took 
the view that, absent explicit Security Council authorization, it would be unlawful. In the aftermath of  
the intervention, general agreement seems to have emerged in legal doctrine that the 2003 Iraq war was 
indeed unlawful under jus ad bellum. As to the latter intervention, it is particularly telling that the UN 
General Assembly called upon states not to recognize any alteration to the status of  Crimea. See G.A. Res 
68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (April 1, 2014).
96 See, e.g., Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Russian Federation: The Pendulum of  Powers and Accountability, in 
democratIc accoUntabIlIty and the Use of force In InternatIonal law 278–279 (Charlotte Ku & Harold Jacobson 
eds., 2003). The author notes that the Russian Federation Council has never refused to give its consent to a 
request for authorization of  foreign deployment and does not seem to be able to control the executive.
97 In greater detail, see fIkfak & hooPer, supra note 93, at 19, and chs. 4 and 6.
98 See also Murray & O’Donoghue, supra note 94, at 324, 332 (pointing to the executive’s ability to cast the 
issue in terms of  national interest and to brand critical voices as “unpatriotic”).
99 See Inmaculada Marrero Rocha, El Discurso Jurídico en los Debates del Congreso de los Diputados: Los Casos 
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frame their actions in light of  the normative framework of  the jus ad bellum and has led 
the international legality of  the operations to be scrutinized in national parliaments. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the government expressly communicated to parlia-
ment two information memorandums, spelling out, among other things, the interna-
tional legal basis for the operations, and also forwarded to parliament the legal advice 
of  an external advisor.100 In Germany, the Research and Documentation Services of  
the Bundestag prepared an updated briefing paper ahead of  the vote early December 
2015, elaborating in detail on the legal context.101 Similar briefing papers were pre-
pared within the UK House of  Commons.102 Furthermore, following the British strike 
of  August 21, 2015 against an IS target in Syria, leading to the death of  British nation-
als103 who were allegedly “actively engaged in planning and directing imminent armed 
attacks against the United Kingdom,”104 the Joint Committee on Human Rights of  the 
British Parliament launched an inquiry into the government’s policy on the use of  
drones for targeted killing.105 The Joint Committee obtained oral and written evidence 
from various sources, including from several established international lawyers. The 
government for its part submitted a four-page memo, focusing primarily on the legal-
ity of  the air strike under the right of  self-defense.106 International law considerations 
also surfaced in the parliamentary debates inter alia in the Netherlands,107 Germany,108 
100 The Netherlands, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kamerbrief  inzake Advies van de Extern 
Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur, Prof. dr. P.A. Nollkaemper, over Luchtaanvallen op IS(IS) Doelen in Irak en 
Syrië, Sept. 24, 2014, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 507 and annex; The Netherlands, Minister van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, Kamerbrief  inzake Nader advies Extern Volkenrechtelijke Adviseur geweldgebruik tegen ISIS in 
Syrië, June 26, 2015, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 543 and annex.
101 Germany, Bundestag—Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Staatliche Selbstverteidigung gegen Terroristen, 
Nov. 30, 2015, http://thomas-hitschler.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/203_15_Staatliche-
Selbstverteidigung-gegen-Terroristen-aktualisierte-Version.pdf.
102 See, e.g., Arabella Lang, Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria, UK House of  Commons Briefing 
Paper CBP-7404 (Dec. 1, 2015), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/
CBP-7404#fullreport.
103 See also United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Sept. 7, 2015, Hansard Record of  Commons 
Debate, at Column 25 (David Cameron).
104 Letter dated September 7, 2015, from the Permanent Representative of  the United Kingdom of  Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of  the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2015/688 (Sept. 8, 2015).
105 See United Kingdom, Parliament–Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s Policy on the 
Use of  Drones for Targeted Killing, HC 574, HL Paper 141 (May 10, 2016), http://www.publications.par-
liament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf. See also Christine Gray et al., Op-Eds on the Joint 
Committee Drones Report, 3 J. Use of force & Int’l L. 194–233 (2016). See also supra note 68, on the inquiry 
conducted by the House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee after the air strikes in April 2018.
106 United Kingdom, Government Memorandum to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Government_Memorandum_on_Drones.
pdf. However, the Committee complained about the government’s lack of  cooperation, see, in particular, 
Government’s Policy on the Use of  Drones for Targeted Killing, supra note 105, paras. 1.55, 1.56.
107 E.g., The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Deelneming aan Internationale Strijd tegen 
ISIS, Oct. 2, 2014, Handelingen, TK 2014–2015, 9, at 9-9-3, 9-9-4, 9-9-7, 9-9-8, 9-9-9, 9-9-11, 9-9-
12, 9-9-14, 9-9-15, 9-9-18. See also The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Nederlandse 
Bijdrage Strijd tegen ISIS, July 2, 2015, Handelingen, TK 2014–2015, 104, at 104-27-1ff.
108 See, in particular, Germany, Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/142, Dec. 2, 2015; Germany, Bundestag, 
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Canada,109 Belgium,110 France,111 and the United Kingdom.112 Overall, the recourse to 
international legal arguments in the dialogues between the executive and legislative 
branches vis-à-vis military operations against IS thus fits in a broader trend and holds 
the potential of  contributing to the relevance of  international law as a yardstick to 
influence and/or assess state conduct. While an in-depth analysis is beyond the pur-
view of  this article, a few cursory comments can be made.
As a preliminary remark, it can be noted that a review of  the parliamentary debates 
on the fight against the so-called Islamic State in the abovementioned countries 
shows that opposition to military involvement was led by left-wing parties, relying 
forcefully upon legal arguments.113 This was undoubtedly the case for opposition par-
ties in Canada (New Democratic Party, Green Party, Liberal Party114), Belgium (Ecolo-
Groen!, sp.a, and PVDA115), and the United Kingdom (Labour116 and SNP117). However, 
even in the other three states where left-wing parties were part of  the governing coali-
tion, or even in charge thereof, these parties were noticeably more hesitant (e.g. the 
Netherlands118) or received significant pushback from even further left-leaning par-
ties (e.g. Germany—Die Linke and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen119; France—Gauche 
109 See, e.g., Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Debates, Mar. 25, 2015, Hansard, vol. 147, 
no. 189, at 12295; Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Debates, Mar. 26, 2015, Hansard, 
vol. 147, no. 190, at 12345, 12346, 12348, 12354, 12359, 12360, 12366, 12367.
110 E.g., Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Séance Plénière, Sept. 26, 2014, Parl Doc CRIV 54 PLEN 005, 
at 7, 12, 15, 21, 37, 53, 54; Belgium, Commissions Réunies des Relations Extérieures et de la Défense 
Nationale, Compte Rendu Intégral, May 18, 2016, Parl. Doc. CRIV 54 COM 425, paras. 01.18, 01.21, 
01.27, 01.31, 01.32, 01.35, 01.36, 01.43.
111 E.g., France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Session Ordinaire de 2015–2016, Première Séance, 
Nov. 25, 2015, at 9838, 9840, 9844, 9847.
112 E.g., United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Aug. 29, 2013, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate, 
cols. 1427, 1430, 1434, 1438, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1446–1447, 1458; United Kingdom, House 
of  Commons, Debate, Sept. 26, 2014, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate, cols. 1263–1264, 1271, 
1279.
113 Note: due to linguistic reasons, the authors have not been able to examine the Danish parliamentary 
records.
114 Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Vote No. 368, Mar. 30, 2015.
115 Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Séance Plénière, June 30, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54 PLEN. 118, 
at 36.
116 The majority of  Labour MPs voted against the government’s motion to extend military operations into 
Syria, although 66 of  them voted in favor. See Andrew Sparrow, Cameron Wins Syria Airstrikes Vote by 
Majority of  174—As It Happened, the GUardIan, Dec. 3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/
live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live?page=with:block-
565f8399e4b05c30c3e4905f#block-565f8399e4b05c30c3e4905f.
117 United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Dec. 2, 2015, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate.
118 See The Netherlands, Vaste Commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie en de Algemene Commissie 
voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg, Mar. 30, 
2016, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 587, at 6 (Michiel Servaes).
119 See, e.g., Germany, Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/143, Dec. 3, 2015, at 13990 (B): “Die Wahrheit ist: Der 
Einsatz ist weder vom Völkerrecht noch vom Grundgesetz gedeckt, was bezüglich der Bundeswehreinsätze noch 
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Démocrate et Républicain120). Although it might be said that “the duty of  the opposi-
tion is to oppose,”121 it seems that left-wing parties thus generally maintained a more 
principled pacifist (and, in casu, legalist) stance, regardless of  their particular role.122
If  legal arguments surfaced in the debates over the coalition against IS in various 
national parliaments, they do not necessarily seem to have played a central role. The 
reliance on arguments drawn from international law varies from one parliament to 
another. Thus, it would appear that international law concerns received considerable 
attention in the debates before the Dutch Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, the Belgian 
Chambre des Représentants, the British House of  Commons, and the German Bundestag, 
but perhaps less so before the French and Canadian parliaments. They were hardly 
discussed at all in the Australian parliament, which is ostensibly related in part to the 
fact that—contrary to the other legislative bodies—it was not formally consulted by 
the executive branch. The legal aspect may be particularly prominent when decisions 
to deploy the armed forces are additionally subject to judicial scrutiny, as is the case in 
Germany. Otherwise, a legislative body’s sensitivity to considerations of  international 
law may vary, depending, for example, on the particular model of  parliamentary 
democracy (is it a genuine liberal democracy or rather a pseudo-democracy where 
critics of  military intervention risk being side-lined? Coalition government or other? 
What is the importance of  party loyalty?123) and the domestic political context.124 
Another factor pertains to the legal expertise present within a parliamentary body. 
Indeed, when presented with a highly technical legal argument, many parliamentar-
ians may feel ill-placed to scrutinize the legal validity of  the executive’s actions.125 In 
such context, the presence of  established (international) lawyers arguably increases 
the likelihood that questions of  international law will be addressed.126
120 France, Assemblée Nationale, XIVe Législature, Deuxième Session Extraordinaire de 2014–2015, 
Première Séance, Sept. 15, 2015, at 7223: “une intervention hors de toute autorisation onusienne placerait la 
France dans l’illégalité au regard du droit international” (François Asensi).
121 William Safire, Essay: The Duty of  an Opposition, the new york tImes, June 8, 1981, http://www.nytimes.
com/1981/06/08/opinion/essay-the-duty-of-an-opposition.html, attributing the quote to the British 
Lord Randolph Spencer Churchill.
122 However, whether this can be extrapolated to all states involved in the coalition against IS remains doubt-
ful. See T. Haesebrouck, Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against Islamic State, 14(2) foreIGn Pol. 
analysIs 254 (2018), concluding: “The pattern of  participation in the air strikes against IS does not con-
vincingly confirm that executive or parliamentary ideology was decisive for participation in the air strikes.”
123 See also Murray & O’Donoghue, supra note 94, at 325, 332.
124 Consider, e.g., Lagassé, supra note 24, at 295 (on Canada: “Not coincidentally, the March 2008 and 
March 2011 votes took place during hung parliaments when the Conservatives were more politically 
vulnerable and acutely aware of  likely elections looming on the horizon.”). Recall also the different atti-
tude of  the Belgian government with respect to the deployment of  aircraft against IS in Iraq in 2014, and 
the subsequent expansion of  the operation to Syria in 2015 (see supra note 65).
125 See, e.g., in respect of  the reliance on the co-belligerency doctrine by successive US administrations and 
the lack of  any in-depth engagement with that argument on the part of  US Congress: Ingber, supra note 
13, at 108, 110.
126 Reference can be made to the elaborate exposé by Craig Scott, Professor of  Law at Osgoode Hall Law 
School (specialized in public international law and international human rights law), in the Canadian 
House of  Commons, referring, among other things, to the position of  the International Court of  Justice 
in the Nicaragua case. See Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Session, Debates, Mar. 26, 2015, 
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On a different note, an analysis of  the debates reveals that the international legal 
mandate received less attention in the parliamentary debates pertaining to opera-
tions on Iraqi soil, as opposed to debates pertaining to the extension of  operations to 
IS targets within Syrian territory. This appears to be linked to the fact that the legal 
basis for the former operations was rather uncontroversial, whereas the opposite was 
true for operations on Syrian territory.127 Indeed, inasmuch as coalition operations in 
Iraq were consented to by the internationally recognized government in Baghdad,128 
this was widely regarded as a sufficient legal basis.129 By contrast, absent similar con-
sent from Damascus for coalition operations on Syrian territory, the legality of  those 
operations was (and still remains) far more contested among international legal schol-
ars130—views indeed differ depending on whether authors opt for a more conservative/
traditional reading of  the right of  self-defense as per the case law of  the International 
Court of  Justice (in essence requiring some degree of  state involvement for attacks by 
non-state armed groups to trigger the right of  self-defense), or rather a more flexible 
interpretation along the lines of  the so-called “unable or unwilling” doctrine.131 The 
latter legal controversy also filtered into the parliamentary debates. Thus, during the 
debate in the Belgian Chambre des Représentants, several MPs referred to contradicting 
legal scholarship on the unwilling/unable doctrine, thereby undermining the strength 
Grieve, the former UK Attorney General, in the British House of  Commons on legal matters seemed to 
carry exceptional weight. But see, for instance, fIkfak & hooPer, supra note 93, on the decrease of  the num-
ber of  lawyers in the UK House of  Commons.
127 See, e.g., Olivier Corten, The Unable and Unwilling Test: Has It Been, and Could It Be, Accepted?, 29 leIden 
J. Int’l l. 777 (2016).
128 See supra note 1. See also U.N.S.C. Res. 2169, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2169, 2 (July 30, 2014). While the author-
ity to invite outside intervention traditionally presupposes that the territorial government exercises effec-
tive control over the state’s territory, practice suggests that the broad international recognition of  the 
person or entity inviting outside intervention may effectively compensate to a large extent for the limited 
degree of  effective territorial control. See Tom Ruys & Luca Ferro, Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal 
Implication of  the Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen, 65 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 61, 85 (2016). See also 
generally Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of  Military Intervention by Invitation of  the Government, 
56 brIt. y.b. Int’l l. 189 (1986).
129 As a matter of  principle, a military intervention consented to by the de jure authorities of  the territorial 
state does not give rise to a breach of  the prohibition on the use of  force under article 2(4) of  the UN 
Charter. See Nicaragua case, I.C.J. Reports 14, para. 246. It follows that there is no need to conceptualize 
the territorial state’s consent as a “circumstance precluding wrongfulness” in terms of  the Articles on the 
International Law Commission’s Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), 
which raises the issue of  the peremptory character of  the prohibition on the use of  force (which some 
claim to be limited to a core prohibition of  “aggression” only). See Annex to G.A. Res 56/83, U.N. Doc 
A/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). See Ruys & Ferro, supra note 128. Further, Erika de Wet, The Modern Practice of  
Intervention by Invitation in Africa and Its Implications for the Prohibition of  the Use of  Force, 26 eUr. J. Int’l l. 
979 (2015).
130 Further, see, e.g., Corten, supra note 127.
131 The “unable or unwilling doctrine” essentially holds that attacks by non-state armed groups can qualify 
as “armed attacks” triggering the right of  self-defense under article 51 of  the UN Charter, irrespective of  
self-defense. At the same time, such attacks permit the “victim State” to exercise this right by engaging 
in military action on the territory of  another state only when the latter state is “unable or unwilling” to 
prevent cross-border attacks by the non-state group. Further, see Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: 
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of  the legal argument espoused (primarily) by the opposition. Moreover, whereas some 
relied on scholarship, others pointed to case law of  the International Court of  Justice 
to make their case. 132
Perhaps even more determinative for the impact of  international legal consider-
ations than the strength of  pacifist parties or the controversial nature of  the legal 
justification put forward by the executive is the presence of  an authoritative legal opin-
ion, with the potential of  nipping much of  the legal argument in the bud. For example, 
the Dutch parliamentarian debate regarding the legal basis for operations in Syria 
seemed by and far settled after the publication of  a legal opinion by a highly regarded 
expert—commissioned by the government—in June 2015 (or perhaps already since 
September 2014, when the first opinion by the expert was shared with MPs).133 This 
is exemplified by one MP’s statement, who observed that the proposed mission “corre-
sponds seamlessly” to the expert opinion.134 Similarly, the governing coalition’s inter-
ventions in the German Bundestag frequently referred to the legal opinion published 
by the latter’s Research and Documentation Services to shield against opposing legal 
arguments. The Foreign Minister himself  claimed that the report had “confirmed the 
constitutionality and legitimacy under international law of  the Bundeswehr’s overseas 
deployment,” which would “hopefully help to clarify the open questions discussed 
here as well as the legal aspects of  the debate.”135 British MPs also seemed reassured by 
the Attorney General’s consenting opinion to the government’s motion136 and brief-
ings prepared by the House of  Commons Library.137 And, on the contrary, because 
such an authoritative “national” report was not present in Belgium, the level of  debate 
pertaining to the correct legal point of  view appears to have soared.138 Although it is 
to be applauded that governments frame their actions in light of  the international law 
by appealing to expert legal opinions, it is somewhat worrisome if  and when these 
opinions on the legality of  the use of  military force are accepted as infallible, even in 
132 See Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Séance Plénière, June 30, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54 PLEN. 118, 
paras. 06.13–06.31. Another interesting example was found in the House of  Lords debates, reproduced 
in the Chilcott report, during which Baroness Symons laconically opined that divisions of  legal opinion 
in international law were “nothing new.” See Chilcott Inquiry, supra note 31, at 571.
133 The second legal opinion was published in June 2015, whereas the first dates from September 2014. See 
supra note 100.
134 The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Nederlandse Bijdrage aan de Strijd tegen ISIS, Feb. 
10, 2016, Handelingen, TK 2015–2016, 53, at 53-9-10 (Michiel Servaes): “Deze missie past feitelijk 
een-op-een op Nollkaemper” (translation provided by the authors).
135 Germany, Federal Foreign Office, Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the German 
Bundestag on the Debate on the Bundeswehr’s Mission against the Terrorist Organisation ISIS, Dec. 2, 
2015, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2015/151202_ISIS.html.
136 United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Oral Answers to Questions, Nov. 26, 2015, Hansard Record of  
Commons Debate, col. 1468 (Attorney General).
137 See, e.g., United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Dec. 2, 2015, Hansard Record of  Commons 
Debate, col. 465 (Stephen Doughty).
138 An interesting discussion furthermore arose in the margin between leading Belgian scholars regarding 
the methodological and deontological issues involved in academics participating (or steering) the public 
debate. See Olivier Corten, A Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of  Self-Defence as a Response to Terrorism, 
eJIl: Talk! (July 14, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-plea-against-the-abusive-invocation-of-self-
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cases—like the example of  coalition operations on Syrian soil—where the voiced opin-
ion is controversial at the very least. This is a fortiori the case where the opinion stems 
not from an external legal expert but rather from government legal advisors, who—
as the UK’s Chilcott Inquiry has amply shown—may be under considerable internal 
political pressure when preparing their advice.139
At times, parliamentary debates suggest that international law is given consider-
able weight and/or offers a rallying point for the opposition. Especially in the case 
of  the prohibition on the use of  force, its explicit invocation in the policy debate can 
question or delegitimize “alternative choices” and raise the “burden of  justification” 
for the government’s proposal.140 Thus, in the Canadian House of  Commons, several 
MPs criticized the absence of  a report to the UN Security Council by the government 
in accordance with article 51 of  the UN Charter (which was eventually submitted a 
few days later) and criticized the government’s disregard of  international law.141 And 
in the Dutch parliament, several MPs as well as the Prime Minister initially took the 
view that no military operations ought to be undertaken in Syrian territory given that 
the conditions for a clear international legal mandate had not (yet) been met.142 In 
the debate in the UK House of  Commons in the summer of  2013, opposition leader 
Edward Milliband asserted that “[t]he UN is not some inconvenient sideshow and 
we do not want to engineer a ‘moment.’ Instead, we want to adhere to the principles 
of  international law.”143 A  Belgian MP also railed against the country’s envisaged 
involvement in Syria, which he considered to clash with the principled stance of  every 
Belgian government since World War II to respect and promote international law.144 
The German opposition to military action in Syria also pointed out that not abiding by 
international law now would render hollow future calls to respect it.145 Finally, the UK 
Joint Committee on Human Rights also commented that the “UK’s compliance with 
its international treaty obligations sends an important message to the rest of  the world 
about the importance of  abiding by international obligations: if  the UK appears to be 
selective in its approach to its international obligations, that would be rapidly seized 
upon and invoked by other States as an excuse for their record of  disrespect for inter-
national law.” Interestingly, the Committee went on to stress that the “importance 
internationally of  the UK being seen to comply with its international obligations is a 
point which has been forcefully made by a number of  significant visitors to the UK.”146
139 See Chilcott Inquiry, supra note 31, and Green & Samuel, supra note 92, at 347–351.
140 Cortell & Davis, supra note 80, at 69.
141 See supra note 109.
142 The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Deelneming aan Internationale Strijd tegen ISIS, 
Oct. 2, 2014, Handelingen, TK 2014–2015, 9, at 9-9-3 ff.
143 United Kingdom, House of  Commons, Debate, Aug. 29, 2013, Hansard Record of  Commons Debate, col. 
1442.
144 Belgium, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Séance Plénière, June 30, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54 PLEN. 
118, para. 06.13 (Dirk Van der Maelen).
145 Germany, Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/143, Dec. 3, 2015, at 13897 (B) (Stefan Liebich).
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At the same time, several counter-examples can be cited. The criticism that the 
Canadian government perceived of  the legal justification of  the operation as an “after-
thought,” as argued by some,147 for instance, cuts both ways. On several occasions, 
members of  parliament moreover fulminated against a strict reliance on the black-
letter law, bordering on outright derision for such arguments. Again in the Canadian 
House of  Commons, (then) Prime Minister Harper, for example, mockingly refuted 
the idea of  “lawyers from ISIL taking the Government of  Canada to court and win-
ning.”148 In the Bundestag, some members insisted that, article 51 of  the UN Charter 
notwithstanding, international law was “no suicide pact” and that they were “not 
in a seminar,” with some appealing to the opposition to “put aside . . . from lecturing 
in a filibuster-like fashion, nitty-gritty, and seminar-style on a differentiated analysis 
of  the legal question.”149 In the Netherlands, one opposition member denounced the 
“cowardice” of  hiding behind the lack of  an international legal mandate,150 whereas 
others introduced the—pointedly derogatory—term “international law fetishism.”151 
Meanwhile in Belgium, a parliamentarian of  the ruling coalition accused opposition 
members of  “protecting IS against the bombing by our F16s,”152 seemingly echoing 
accusations by British government officials warning against siding with “terrorist 
sympathisers” ahead of  the parliamentary vote.153 A mixed picture thus emerges.
Arguably, increased parliamentary (and judicial) oversight of  the executive’s “war 
powers” may also have a peculiar side effect in that the focus of  the legal debate may 
gradually shift from the international legal perspective to a domestic/constitutional 
perspective. By way of  illustration, when parliaments conditionally approve the deploy-
ment of  the armed forces in a given operation, subsequent scrutiny may focus more on 
the compliance of  the executive with those conditions (ratione temporis, etc.) imposed 
by parliament, rather than with the intrinsic validity of  the action under international 
law proper. This is to some extent what has happened in the United States. It is tell-
ing, for example, that the speech by the US Department of  Defense General Counsel 
Stephen Preston at the annual meeting of  the American Society of  International Law 
147 Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Debates, Mar. 26, 2015, Hansard, vol. 147, no. 190, at 
12367 (Craig Scott).
148 Canada, House of  Commons, 41st Parl., 2d Sess., Debates, Mar. 25, 2015, Hansard, vol. 147, no. 189, at 
1420 (Stephen Harper).
149 Cited (and translated) by Anne Peters, German Parliament Decides to Send Troops to Combat ISIS—Based on 
Collective Self-Defense “In Conjunction With’ SC Res. 2249,” eJIl: Talk! (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.
org/german-parlament-decides-to-send-troops-to-combat-isis-%E2%88%92-based-on-collective-self-
defense-in-conjunction-with-sc-res-2249/.
150 The Netherlands, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Deelneming aan Internationale Strijd tegen ISIS, 
Oct. 2, 2014, Handelingen, TK 2014–2015, 9, at 9-9-4 (Geert Wilders).
151 The Netherlands, Vaste Commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie en de Algemene Commissie 
voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg, June 30, 
2015, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 560, at 45.
152 Belgium, Chambre des Représentants, Séance Plénière, June 30, 2016, Parl. Doc. 54 PLEN. 118, para. 
06.02 (Karolien Grosemans) (translation provided by the authors).
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in 2015,154 one of  several high-level speeches explaining the US government’s posi-
tion on the use of  military force after 9/11, focused primarily on the compatibility 
of  the government’s actions, including the military operations against IS, with the 
existing AUMF resolutions adopted by Congress in 2001 and 2002,155 rather than 
with its compatibility with international law. While other, similar high-level speeches 
by key officials have been more deferential to both domestic and international law,156 
debates within US Congress again appear to have focused exclusively on the scope of  
the 2001 AUMF—specifically on whether that resolution contains a blanket authori-
zation for military operations against IS. By contrast, one is hard pressed to find even 
a single reference to the UN Charter, or to international law, in the relevant records 
of  the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, or the House Armed Services Committee.157 
In the dialogue between the executive and the legislative branch, specific attention 
was paid to the notion of  “associated persons or forces,” a concept which is key to 
the executive branch’s understanding of  the 2001 AUMF resolution,158 but which is 
unknown to the jus ad bellum.159 The use of  such specific terms and conditions may in 
154 US Department of  Defense, Speech by Stephen W. Preston: The Legal Framework for the United States’ 
Use of  Military Force since 9/11, April 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/
Article/606662.
155 See Ruys et al., Digest of  State Practice: 1 January (2015), supra note 5, at 294–295.
156 See, e.g., the speech by Brian Egan at the 2016 ASIL Annual Meeting, to be found at Benjamin Wittes, 
State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan’s Speech at ASIL, lawfare, April 8, 2016, https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/state-department-legal-adviser-brian-egans-speech-asil. Similarly, the December 2016 Report 
on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the United States’ use of  military force and related national 
security operations, issued by the Obama administration, tackles both the domestic legal bases for US 
military force abroad as well as the international law aspects. See supra note 56.
157 E.g., see, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on United States Strategy to Defeat the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., S. HRG. 113–668 (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/browse/committeecong.action?collection=CHRG&committee=foreignrelations&chamber=sen
ate&congressplus=113&ycord=0 (although see a statement by (then) US Secretary of  State John Kerry at 
25–26: “our lawyers also are clear that Iraq has the right of  self-defense, and Iraq is exercising its right of  
self-defense and asking the United States to help it. . . . And as a matter of  right, if  they are being attacked 
from outside their country, you have a right of  hot pursuit. You have a right to be able to attack those peo-
ple who are attacking you as a matter of  self-defense.”); US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing 
on U.S. Policy towards Iraq and Syria and the Threat Posed by the Islamic State of  Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
113th Cong., 2d Sess., S. HRG. 113–589 (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/commit-
teecong.action?collection=CHRG&committee=armedservices&chamber=senate&congressplus=113&yc
ord=0; US House of  Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on the ISIS Threat: Weighing 
the Obama Administration’s Response, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 113–219 (Sept. 18, 2014), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/committeecong.action?collection=CHRG&committee=intrelations&cham
ber=house&congressplus=113&ycord=0; US House of  Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
Hearing on the Administration’s Strategy for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., 
HASC No. 113–126 (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/committeecong.action?collecti
on=CHRG&committee=armedservices&chamber=house&congressplus=113&ycord=0.
158 See supra note 55.
159 What is particularly remarkably in this context is that the US executive branch has based its expansive 
interpretation of  the congressional authorization to use military force (the AUMF 2001) on a doctrine 
that is borrowed from international law. Specifically, the executive branch has argued that the AUMF 
2001 authorizes the use of  force against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and “associated forces,” and that the lat-
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turn infect the justificatory discourse at the international level and result in a certain 
cross-pollination between the international and domestic legal debate, leading gov-
ernments to adapt their international legal arguments to better fit with the domestic 
legal framework.
In the end, while the evidence is not completely unequivocal, an examination of  
parliamentary debates on the authorization of  the use of  force as part of  the US-led 
coalition against IS generally tends to support the view that increased parliamentary 
involvement in the executive’s war powers contributes to the relevance of  the jus ad 
bellum as a discursive tool. It is not unlikely that this awareness of  international legal 
concerns will further gain traction pursuant to the activation in July 2018 of  the 
International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of  aggression pursuant to 
article 8bis of  the Rome Statute.160 The prospect (if  only remote) of  political and mili-
tary leaders being held criminally accountable for military interventions abroad—as 
opposed to the sole risk of  state responsibility—may indeed result in greater atten-
tion for jus ad bellum considerations in the domestic decision-making process. As 
Dinstein puts it: “Only if  it dawns upon the actual decision-makers that—when they 
carry their country along the path of  war in contravention of  international law—
they expose themselves to individual criminal accountability, are they likely to hesitate 
before taking the fateful step.”161 As such, especially for those countries where formal 
parliamentary war powers remain limited or inexistent, the recent activation of  the 
ICC’s jurisdiction in respect to crimes of  aggression may provide a good opportunity 
to reconsider the role of  the legislative branch with respect to foreign troop deploy-
ments, and, possibly, to provide for proper democratic oversight in respect of  any “use 
of  armed force”—thus aligning the trigger of  parliamentary war powers to the UN 
Charter (article 2(4)) and the Rome Statute (article 8bis).
The executive branch has thus—controversially—sought to rely on permissive rules of  international law 
in order to claim an expansive interpretation of  its powers under domestic law. Paraphrasing the famous 
US Supreme Court judgment, Ingber labels this “power-enhancing interpretive mechanism as a Reverse 
Betsy.” Ingber, supra note 13, at 79. Ingber, moreover, expresses regret regarding how members of  
Congress made little effort to critically examine the executive’s (artificial) co-belligerency argument. She 
concludes that “the Executive’s invocation of  a little known concept from international law to interpret 
its domestic statutory authority enabled it to promote a flexible and ultimately expansive understanding 
of  that authority with very little pushback from the courts or Congress.” Id. at 115–116.
160 For an in-depth analysis of  the crime of  aggression under the Rome Statute, see the crIme of aGGressIon: 
a commentary 2 vols. (Claus Kreβ & Stefan Barriga eds., 2017).
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